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ABSTRACT
Julie Rose argues that free time is a proper concern of distributive justice 
and that all citizens have a legitimate claim to a fair share of free time. Her 
argument relies on the effective freedoms principle, which says that all 
citizens have a legitimate claim to a fair share of the resources required to 
exercise their formal liberties and opportunities. Rose argues that free 
time is one such resource, which entails that all citizens have a legitimate 
claim to a fair share of free time. I argue that Rose’s argument does not 
establish a claim to a fair share of free time, at least not if we understand 
fairness to mean something more than that all should receive their due. I 
also suggest an extension of Rose’s argument that yields the conclusion 
that all citizens have a legitimate claim to a cooperatively fair share of free 
time. 
Keywords: time, justice, freedom, rights, fairness, work
“In capitalist society, free time is produced for one class by the conversion 
of the whole lifetime of the masses into labourtime.” (Marx 1976: 667)
1. INTRODUCTION
In Free Time, Julie Rose argues that “justice requires that all citizens have a 
fair share of free time” (2016: 4; see also 1, 5, 17, 63, 68, 73, 85, 92, 128). Rose 
defines free time as “time beyond that which is objectively necessary for 
one to spend on one’s own basic needs, or the basic needs of one’s 
dependents” (2016: 58). Accordingly, justice requires that all citizens have 
a fair share of time to spend on pursuits other than these basic needs. This 
thesis might appear uncontroversial, but, as Rose notes (2016: 1, 3, 17-18, 
90), most contemporary theories of justice do not include any principles 
concerning the distribution of free time. Moreover, if sound, her argument 
1 I am grateful to Tom Parr, two anonymous reviewers, and Lauren McGillicuddy for 
helpful written comments on an earlier version of this essay.
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warrants a complaint of justice against most societies, for few societies 
seem to secure a fair share of free time for all.
Rose’s argument starts with the effective freedoms principle, which Rose 
states as follows (2016: 66-7; see also 4, 73, 74, 101, 111, 128-30): “citizens 
have legitimate claims to a fair share of the resources generally required to 
exercise their formal liberties and opportunities”. Rose takes this principle 
as a given, since it is endorsed by “nearly all theories of distributive justice” 
(2016: 66; also 90). Liberals tend to use this principle to defend conclusions 
about material conditions, but Rose argues (2016: chapters 3 and 4) that 
free time is generally required to exercise formal liberties and opportunities. 
To illustrate, think of the political rights of democratic citizenship: rights 
to form, join, and leave political parties, to voice one’s opinion in political 
matters, to participate in elections, and so on. Exercising these rights takes 
time – time to discern the nature of political questions, the positions of the 
candidates, what justice and efficiency requires, and to vote on election 
days (Rose 2016: 73-74). In general, it takes time to exercise many of the 
formal liberties that liberals argue all citizens should enjoy; so, by the 
effective freedoms principle, justice requires that all have a fair share of 
free time. Here is the argument in overview:
1. All citizens have a legitimate claim to a fair share of the resources 
generally required to exercise their formal liberties and opportunities. 
(= The effective freedoms principle.).
2. Free time is a resource generally required to exercise one’s formal 
liberties and opportunities.
3. Therefore, all citizens have a legitimate claim to a fair share of free 
time.
Rose’s argument offers an important corrective to a theoretical neglect 
of a real and practical dispute. Free time is a subject of justice; it has been 
neglected by political philosophy, and all citizens have a claim to free time. 
Moreover, since time has played a central role in the struggle between 
capital and labor, the theoretical neglect of free time, and time more 
generally, is remarkable. The history of the working class is as much a 
history of the struggle for time – for shorter and reasonably organized 
work-weeks, pay for overtime, lunchbreaks, sick-days, holidays, vacation, 
varieties of paid and unpaid leaves – as for fair wages and workplace safety.2 
This struggle for time continues.
However, I have some concerns about Rose’s argument. Rose relies on the 
2 For example, the 1891 Erfurt Program of the German Social Democratic Party 
demands an eight-hour workday, limitations on night-work, and uninterrupted rest periods 
of at least 36 hours once per week (e.g. Sundays off work).
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effective freedoms principle to establish the conclusion that all citizens have a 
legitimate claim to a fair share of free time. But I doubt that the effective 
freedoms principle can get her this conclusion, at least not if we understand 
“fair share” in terms of cooperative fairness.
I also worry that Rose’s reliance on the effective freedoms principle 
leads her to miss an opportunity for thinking about free time as an issue of 
justice which is theoretically appealing, true to the historical (and 
continuing) struggles for time, and can support the sort of claims to a 
cooperatively fair share of free time that the effective freedoms principle 
does not deliver.
My argument begins with a few distinctions. First, I distinguish between 
two parts of economic justice, which I call enabling and distributive 
justice. The former requires that all citizens are enabled to participate as 
free and equal in social cooperation, the latter that the distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of cooperation is fair. Second, there is the already 
indicated ambiguity in the notion of fairness. Fairness can be understood 
as the somewhat vacuous requirement that the resources useful for 
pursuing conceptions of the good in general (so-called all-purpose means) 
should be fairly distributed. But it can also be understood in terms of the 
more specific notion of cooperative fairness, where it says that cooperators 
have a claim to receive a fair share of the benefits, and to carry only a fair 
share of the burdens, of their cooperation.
Third, there is an ambiguity in the effective freedoms principle which 
leads to two different arguments that free time is a concern of economic 
justice. Free time is of concern to justice, both because free time is necessary 
for exercising basic liberties and because free time is an all-purpose means.3 
This duality is mirrored in two different readings of the effective freedoms 
principle and these, in turn, issue different requirement of justice with respect 
to free time. On one reading, the effective freedoms principle is tied to the 
basic liberties. On another reading, the effective freedoms principle is tied to 
the ability to freely pursue one’s interests. Rose does not have to choose 
between these meanings, for she shows that free time is a resource in both 
senses. However, I argue that the effective freedoms principle is best 
understood as tied to basic liberties, and that, thus understood, the claims of 
justice it supports are not claims to fair shares of free time, but rather 
sufficientarian claims to adequate amounts of free time. 
The indicated ambiguities are not particular to Rose’s argument, nor do 
they by themselves produce fallacies or nasty dilemmas. But resolving them 
3 “[F]ree time is required both to exercise many of one’s fundamental freedoms and 
to pursue one’s con-ception of the good, whatever it may be” (Rose 2016: 71).
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will, I hope, bring more clarity to the (in my opinion, limited) purchase of the 
effective freedoms principle. It will also allow me to suggest a way to extend 
Rose’s argument so that it supports the conclusion that all citizens have a 
claim to a cooperatively fair share of free time.
2. ECONOMIC JUSTICE: ENABLING AND DISTRIBUTIVE
If we accept the Rawlsian idea that we should think about the principles 
of economic justice as the basic rules of cooperation between free and 
equal citizens, the principles of justice can then be applied to draw 
distinctions between different resources (or primary goods) according to 
how they are related to the social cooperation governed by these 
principles. In the Rawlsian framework, these all-purpose means include 
basic liberties, opportunities, wealth and income, and the social bases of 
self-respect. Some of these resources (the basic liberties and the resources 
required to exercise them) are of interest to economic justice because 
they enable citizens to participate as free and equal in the system of 
social cooperation. Other resources are of interest to ensure the ongoing 
fairness of the distribution of opportunities to pursue one’s goals, 
benefits, and burdens of cooperation. 
The general notion of all-purpose means can thus be disaggregated 
into three ways in which resources are of interest to economic justice:
First, as basic rights and liberties necessary for citizens to develop 
and exercise the moral powers engaged in social cooperation.
Second, as the material (and temporal) background conditions for 
citizens to actually enjoy these rights and liberties to the sufficient 
degree.
Third, as the inputs and outputs (burdens and benefits) of the 
productive and distributive processes of social cooperation.
Of course, the same resource can appear in multiple categories. Thus, 
wealth will appear both as the second and third sorts of resource, since 
some wealth is necessary to exercise one’s basic rights and wealth is an 
output of social cooperation.
This way of thinking about how resources are significant for justice also 
indicates a division of the subject of economic justice – a division that I 
believe is general to those liberal egalitarian theories of justice that should 
share Rose’s commitments, and which turn out to be helpful for my 
discussion of her argument. This is the division between the enabling and 
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the distributive parts of economic justice.4
Enabling justice is concerned with empowering all citizens to be free 
and equal participants in social cooperation. Distributive justice is about 
how we should distribute the burdens and benefits of social cooperation 
taking place among citizens thus empowered. Enabling justice requires 
that all members have access to the rights and means sufficient to 
participate in social cooperation as free and equal. Distributive justice 
requires that citizens carry at most a fair share of the burdens and receive 
at least a fair share of the benefits of social cooperation. In terms of the 
three kinds of resources identified above, we can say that enabling justice 
is concerned with the first two kinds; distributive justice with the third 
kind. In Rawls’s theory of justice, the first principle of justice expresses the 
requirements of enabling justice, the second principle expresses the 
requirements of distributive justice. Enabling justice is sufficientarian. 
The aim is to ensure that all citizens are empowered to cooperate, which 
means they should all enjoy access to the basic liberties and the means 
sufficient to exercise these. Distributive justice could be, but typically is 
not sufficientarian, for the claims it supports are to fair relative shares of 
burdens and benefits.
3. TWO NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS
The general requirement of economic justice is that we should seek a just 
(we might say, fair) distribution of all-purpose means. Rose shows that 
free time is an all-purpose means and so should be fairly distributed. 
However, notice that little is revealed by saying that these resources 
should be fairly distributed. This general notion of fairness says little 
more than that these resources are proper subjects of economic justice, 
so that all should receive their due of these. It is the role of the principles 
of economic justice to specify what a fair distribution of these resources 
would look like.
We find a more interesting notion of fairness when it is defined in 
terms of cooperation, so that the basic norm is that the rules that govern 
cooperation must secure each cooperator’s claim to a fair share of the 
benefits and burdens of their cooperation. To be clear, here are the two 
notions of fairness:5 
4 These two parts do not exhaust the subject of justice, but they are the main parts 
of what I call economic justice, that is, the principles that should guide the design of 
institutions that define and regulate social cooperation.
5 There are, of course, many others.
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Non-cooperative fairness: we can talk about fairness as the general 
notion governing the distribution of all-purpose means in general. 
The norm is that all-purpose means should be fairly distributed.
Cooperative fairness: we can talk about fairness in terms of the 
claims of cooperators to the benefits and burdens of their 
cooperation. Here the norm is that all cooperators receive at least a 
fair share of the benefits, and carry no more than a fair share of the 
burdens, of cooperation. 
The distinction applies in other contexts as well. If we are served with a 
pie, then all should receive their fair share of it (non-cooperative fairness). 
If we bake the pie together, each has a claim to a fair share of it (cooperative 
fairness). But the distinction has particular relevance for economic justice, 
for theories of economic justice can be divided into those that theorize 
economic justice in terms of cooperative fairness and those that do not.
The non-cooperative notion of fairness is pre-theoretical and vacuous. 
To say that justice requires that all receive their fair share in this sense is to 
say that all should receive their due – a statement that, if not analytical, is 
so generic that any and all theories of justice could include it. Libertarians, 
classical liberals, socialists, Rawlsians, and social democrats could all 
agree to this principle, while disagreeing about what it means.
The cooperative notion of fairness is the general norm of what I called 
distributive justice above. It presents us with a stronger and more 
interesting notion of fairness. One indication of its relative strength is that 
right-liberal and libertarian theories of justice would not accept it as norm 
of economic justice, since they reject the idea that we should think of 
society as a system of social cooperation (e.g. Hayek 1978; Nozick 1974: 
chapter 7). And it is more interesting, since the notion ties fairness directly 
to the claims that cooperators can make on each other as cooperators, 
which invites more demanding norms of reciprocity and the idea that 
departures from an equal distribution must be reasonably acceptable to 
those who have less (since all come into the cooperative relationship as 
free and equal and thus with an initially equal claim to the benefits and 
burdens of cooperation).
To further illustrate the distinction, it might be helpful to think again in 
terms of Rawls’s theory of justice. The general question is what a fair 
distribution of all-purpose means would look like (using the non-
cooperative notion of fairness). The two principles of justice answer this 
question. However, this answer involves the cooperative notion of fairness, 
namely the claim to a fair share of benefits and burdens that each 
cooperator has as cooperator. While this cooperative notion of fairness is 
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more specific in terms of content than the first, it also needs further 
specification. In Rawls’s theory this further specificity is provided by the 
second principle of justice. Other theories might offer different principles 
to specify cooperative fairness, but the notion itself restricts the domain of 
available answers.
With this distinction in mind, we can see that Rose’s conclusion that all 
citizens have a claim to a fair share of free time is ambiguous between the 
weaker conclusion that free time should be fairly distributed where fairness 
is used in the non-cooperative, untheorized, and less demanding sense; 
and the stronger conclusion that free time is subject to the norms of 
cooperative fairness. In the following two sections I argue that Rose’s 
arguments from the effective freedoms principle can support only the 
weaker of these two conclusions. In section 5 I sketch an argument that 
leads to the stronger conclusion.
4. TWO READINGS OF THE EFFECTIVE FREEDOMS PRINCIPLE
Corresponding to the two senses in which free time is a resource, we can 
distinguish between two readings of the effective freedoms principle:
General liberty reading: All citizens should receive a fair share of 
all-purpose means useful for freely pursuing their conception of 
the good, whatever it may be.
Basic liberties reading: All citizens have a legitimate claim to the 
resources adequate to exercise their basic liberties. 
Both of these are at work in Rose’s argument; the first, when she treats 
free time as an all-purpose means; the second, when she treats it as 
required for the exercise of basic liberties. 
It seems clear that the first reading of the effective freedoms principle 
simply restates the general requirement of non-cooperative fairness that 
all-purpose means should be fairly distributed, which means that nearly 
all theories of justice can include it.
The second reading of the principle has more bite, and it seems that 
right-liberals and libertarians would reject it. This need not concern Rose, 
for the principle has a secure place in any liberal egalitarian theory of 
justice of the sort which Rose argues should concur with her conclusions. 
Rose shows that free time is necessary for various basic liberties, including 
freedom of occupation, basic political rights, and freedom of association 
(2016: 91, 73-4, chapter 5). These arguments successfully establish that all 
citizens have a claim to the sufficient measure of free time required to 
exercise these liberties.
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Though Rose uses both readings of the effective freedoms principle, 
this is a strength of her argument, rather than a problem, for it shows that 
free time is a subject of justice in two distinct senses: in general, as an all-
purpose means, and in particular, as a condition of the exercise of basic 
liberties. The problem, rather, is that neither of these senses supports the 
stronger conclusion that free time is a subject of cooperative fairness, 
which means that her conclusion – that all citizens have a claim to a fair 
share of free time – is true only if we take fairness in the non-cooperative 
and vacuous sense. At least, so I argue in the following section. 
5. FREE TIME AS SUBJECT OF ENABLING JUSTICE
To give some substance to my worry, it will be helpful to look at the place of 
the effective freedoms principle in Rawls’s theory of justice.6 Looking at 
Rawls also offers further explanation for why enabling justice is 
sufficientarian.
Rawls repeatedly says that something like the effective freedoms 
principle defines membership in the family of liberal theories of justice. 
Rawls defines liberalism as those theories of justice that affirm the basic 
rights and liberties familiar from liberal democratic regimes, give special 
priority to these rights and liberties, and secure for all citizens “adequate 
all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties and opportunities” 
(1996: 6; see also lix; Rawls 2008: 12; Rawls 2001: 141). In this sense he 
affirms the effective freedoms principle. Yet the effective freedoms 
principle is not a distinct principle alongside the two principles of justice 
as fairness, and Rawls appears to think it is covered by what he says with 
respect to the enabling conditions of the first principle of justice, the 
principle of equal basic liberties. 
The first principle itself does not affirm or contain the effective freedoms 
principle, but in Political Liberalism, Rawls writes that the first principle 
should be understood as working within a setting where citizens’ basic 
needs are met, “at least insofar as their being met is necessary for citizens 
to be able to understand and to be able to fruitfully exercise those rights 
and liberties” (1996: 7). Thus, Rawls employs the effective freedoms 
principle in the second, basic liberties reading identified above. And as 
such, the principle issues the sufficientarian requirement that basic needs 
are met, where needs are understood as the preconditions for exercising 
the basic rights and liberties. Accordingly, it is not the case that citizens 
have a legitimate claim to a fair share of the resources required for 
6 Rose (2016: 67, 70) mentions Rawls as exemplary endorser of the effective freedoms 
principle.
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exercising their basic liberties; rather, they have a legitimate claim to the 
amount of those resources adequate to exercise their basic liberties. By the 
distinction drawn earlier, the effective freedoms principle thus serves as a 
principle of enabling rather than of distributive justice. 
The role of the effective freedoms principle in Rawls’s theory illustrates 
how it serves as a principle of enabling justice, and can be satisfied whether 
or not citizens receive a cooperatively fair share of resources. As a principle of 
enabling justice, the principle carries a target and cutoff point for the re-
sources it covers – once all citizens have enough of those resources to 
exercise their basic liberties, it issues no further requirements.
To summarize, once we have the distinction between enabling and 
distributive justice in hand, and once we have distinguished between non-
cooperative and cooperative fairness, and once we have clarified the two 
readings of the effective freedoms principle, we can say that:
First, if we use the general liberty reading of the effective freedoms 
principle, then the principle says little more than that all-purpose 
means should be fairly distributed, where fairness is used in the 
non-cooperative, pre-theoretical, vacuous sense. In this employment, 
the effective freedoms principle does support the conclusion that 
free time should be fairly distributed, but not in the strong sense of 
cooperative fairness.
Second, if we use the basic liberty reading of the effective freedoms 
principle, then the principle is a principle of enabling justice. As 
such, it issues strong requirements of justice with respect to free 
time, namely, that all must enjoy access to free time sufficient to 
enjoy their basic liberties. However, this requirement does not 
support claims to fair shares, merely to adequate amounts. 
So, third, neither of the two readings of the effective freedoms 
principle can be used to establish the conclusion that the 
distribution of free time is a subject of the cooperative norms of 
fairness of distributive justice. 
So, fourth, Rose’s argument has not established that all citizens 
have a claim to a fair share of free time, if we understand fairness in 
the stronger sense of cooperative fairness. 
Rose’s main conclusion that free time is a subject of justice stands 
untouched by my argument. Indeed, she has shown that the distribution of 
free time should be fair, if we understand fairness in the general, 
pre-theoretical, non-cooperative sense that people should receive their 
due share of free time. Moreover, as Rose makes clear (2016: 128-3), she 
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does not claim that her argument determines which principle should 
govern the distribution of free time, so she can leave that matter to be 
settled by the various theories of justice in light of their respective 
interpretations of fairness.
However, by relying on the effective freedoms principle, Rose’s 
argument misses an opportunity for developing free time as a subject of 
what I have called distributive justice and thus as subject to the stronger 
norms of cooperative fairness. In the following section I offer a suggestion 
to extend Rose’s argument and make free time a subject of norms of 
cooperative fairness; thereby offering a way to reach the conclusion that 
all citizens have a legitimate claim to a fair share of free time, in the 
stronger, cooperative sense of a fair share.
However, first, I want to acknowledge two complications that deserve 
mention, though they do not change my conclusion. First, even as subjects 
of enabling justice, some resources are rivalrous goods: the amount of 
them needed to exercise a basic liberty depends on what others have. This 
makes it harder to determine what the adequate amount is, but it does not 
change the nature of the claim, which is to an adequate amount; thus, 
there is a threshold at which the claim of enabling justice to that resource 
is fully satisfied (even if this threshold varies with what others have). This 
point generalizes to other sufficientarian claims of justice; even if the 
resource covered by the sufficientarian guarantee is a rivalrous good, the 
nature of the claim still has the sufficientarian characteristics of adequacy, 
cutoff-points, and non-relativity (even if the absolute amount one has a 
claim to is a function of what others have, it is still not a claim to a relative 
share, but to enough to pass the threshold, which may depend on what 
others have).
The second complication is that some (if not most) resources are 
subjects of both enabling and distributive justice. Again, take money as an 
example. On one hand, money is needed to exercise basic liberties, so all 
citizens have a legitimate claim of enabling justice to enough income and 
wealth to exercise their basic liberties. On the other hand, money serves as 
both an input and an output of the system of cooperation (and translates 
smoothly into many of the benefits and burdens of cooperation), so the 
distribution of income and wealth also is a proper subject of distributive 
justice, meaning that all citizens have a legitimate claim to a cooperatively 
fair share of income and wealth. Below, we shall see that free time also is a 
subject of justice in both senses.
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6. FREE TIME AS A SUBJECT OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
It is, I think, hard for an argument that relies on the effective freedoms 
principle to deliver norms of cooperative fairness. Here I suggest a way in 
which Rose’s argument could be extended to distributive justice and issue 
the more demanding norms of cooperative fairness that rule that domain. 
For I do think that time and free time are proper subjects also of distributive 
(rather than only enabling) justice, and that norms of cooperative fairness 
apply to the distribution of free time. But to see this, we have to think 
outside the scope of the effective freedoms principle.
Let us return to time and free time as resources. As Rose identifies it 
(2016: 46), a resource that could plausibly be the subject of a claim of justice 
must be “generally required to pursue any conception of the good,” and it 
must be practically possible to know and verify whether individuals 
possess the resource. I suggested earlier that this general notion can be 
disaggregated into three sorts of resources: basic liberties, the means 
needed to exercise these to the sufficient degree, and the inputs and 
outputs of social cooperation. The basic liberties reading of the effective 
freedoms principle deals with the second of these; norms of cooperative 
fairness deal with the third. Rose shows that free time is an all-purpose 
means required for the exercise of basic liberties. I argue that free time is 
also a resource in the third sense, which makes it subject to the norms of 
cooperative fairness.
Why do we have social cooperation in the first place? One straight- 
forward answer is that through social cooperation we get better access to 
all the good things of life: security, transportation, comfortable shelter, 
food, potable fluids, peace, freedom, stability, the pursuit and dissemination 
of knowledge, cultural enrichments, innovation and the development of 
technologies, health-care, comforts in old age; the list goes on and on. A 
host of things that human beings care about are available only in society 
and through social cooperation. There are, of course, inputs and outputs to 
the processes by which these many goods and advantages are produced 
and distributed: resources are both consumed and created by these 
processes. One way to think about distributive justice (the right way, I 
think) is that we need principles to guide the distribution of both inputs 
and outputs – the sharing of the burdens and benefits of social cooperation. 
Time is one of the inputs to this process of social cooperation, and free 
time is one of the outputs. Even with every advance of modern technology, 
what we produce requires the investment of time alongside other inputs 
such as natural resources and knowledge. The time thus spent is work (in a 
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broad sense); burdensome, but productive.7 (This expands the concept of 
work to include currently uncompensated care-work and uncompensated 
artistic endeavors that truly enrich society). For in exchange for the 
collective time spent working, we get not only all the good products of our 
work, but our collective work also frees up time itself – the division of labor 
and the productive nature of social cooperation and the progress that we 
make when we cooperate all make it so that we do not have to work every 
waking hour to satisfy our basic needs or the basic needs of our dependents. 
(Some still do, and if they must, maybe that is unjust for the reasons Rose 
lists, and because they do not receive a cooperatively fair share of free 
time). If we didn’t live in society and cooperate, we would spend nearly all 
our time trying to survive; living in society, we sometimes are released 
from the imperatives of basic needs and have time to do what we want. 
Free time is, of course, intangible and usually not traded as a separate 
commodity, but the same could be said for the other main social goods: 
freedom, security, and access to knowledge and cultural enrichments.
The norms of cooperative fairness say that the distribution of the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation should be distributed in a 
manner that is fair to all cooperating parties. Since time is a factor of 
production and free time one of the products, it follows that all cooperating 
citizens have a claim to contribute no more than their fair share of time, 
that is, to work no more than their fair part, and to receive no less than 
their fair share of free time. They can, of course, choose to keep working in 
their free time, insofar as they want to exchange their free-time resource 
for other resources. 
It is hard to say much more in the abstract about what cooperatively fair 
shares of benefits and burdens are. But we can say that time and free time 
are proper subjects of distributive justice and the norms of cooperative 
fairness appropriate to it. And that, in turn, allows us to say that the 
requirements of justice with respect to time are open-ended rather than 
sufficientarian (there is no target and cutoff point), that inequalities of free 
time need justification, that relative shares of free time matter, that the 
struggle for a fair distribution of work time and free time continues beyond 
the point where all citizens have enough time to exercise their basic 
liberties, and that it looks like a problem of justice when some must work a 
lot and others work little; when some have just enough free time, while 
others can choose a life of leisure. If Marx was right (cf. opening quote), the 
problem is not merely that the working class has insufficient free time, but 
7 Of course, not all work is equally burdensome and perhaps some work is not 
burdensome at all. But for the purposes of distributive justice, it makes sense to assume, so 
that sentence reads "it makes sense to assume that work is normally burdensome."
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that a capitalist society tends to suffer from an unfair distribution of work 
time and free time. 
Thus, time is a subject of justice in two ways and citizens have at least 
two distinct claims of justice when it comes to free time. First, as Rose 
persuasively argues, free time is a subject of enabling justice. As such, free 
time is covered by the effective freedoms principle and all citizens have a 
claim to an amount of free time sufficient to exercise their basic rights. 
Second, as sketched in this section, work time and free time are subjects of 
the norms of cooperative fairness that govern distributive justice. As such, 
all citizens have a claim to use no more than a fair share of time at work, 
and to receive no less than their fair share of free time in return for their work. 
The history of the working class struggle for time is based on both of 
these claims of justice. But I believe that in capitalist economies, the 
tendency is for the capitalists to receive more than their fair share of free 
time, and to provide less than their fair share of time as a factor of 
production. The leisure class have their good times at the expense of the 
hard times of the working class. And that is unfair, not because the working 
classes do not have enough time to exercise their basic liberties – if that is 
the case, it is unjust in another sense – but because this exhibits an unfair 
distribution of the burdens and benefits of cooperation. When the working 
classes keep fighting for shorter and more reasonably structured work 
weeks, paid vacation, and so on, they have not and need not couch their 
demands in terms of basic needs, for they can make their claims in terms 
of cooperative fairness; of carrying only their fair share of the burden and 
receiving their fair share of the benefits of the productive processes of 
society. By contrast with claims based on the effective freedoms principle 
(or similar principles of enabling justice), cooperative fairness justifies 
claims to fair shares on an ongoing basis even after all basic needs have 
been met. The struggle between capital and labor does not end once basic 
needs are met (or the effective freedoms principle is satisfied); the struggle 
for fairness remains.
7. CONCLUSION
Rose argues that the effective freedoms principle supports a claim for all 
citizens to a fair share of free time. I have argued that the effective freedoms 
principle is ambiguous between two readings, each of which supports a 
distinct argument with respect to free time. On the first reading, the 
effective freedoms principle restates the general idea that all-purpose 
means should be fairly distributed. Since free time is such an all-purpose 
means, it should be fairly distributed. On the second reading the principle 
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requires that all citizens have access to the resources required to exercise 
their basic liberties. Since some measure of free time is required to exercise 
basic liberties, all citizens should enjoy access to this measure of free time. 
Both arguments are sound; Rose has successfully established that free 
time is a proper subject of justice. However, neither of the arguments 
establishes that all citizens have a legitimate claim to a fair share of free 
time – at least not if we understand fairness in the stronger sense of 
cooperative fairness. For the first argument establishes that all citizens 
should receive a fair share, but employs the general, non-cooperative, and 
vacuous notion of fairness. The second argument does not establish a 
claim to a fair share, but a claim to the amount adequate to exercise the 
basic liberties.
I also suggested a way in which Rose’s argument can be extended to 
establish the stronger conclusion that free time is a subject of cooperative 
fairness, though to do so we have move beyond the effective freedoms 
principle. For, I argued, time and free time are real concerns of distributive 
(as opposed to enabling) justice, and as such are subjects of norms of 
cooperative fairness. Time spent working is one of the inputs and burdens 
of the cooperative processes by which we create the social goods, and free 
time is one of the outputs and benefits made available through social 
cooperation. Thus, all citizens have a claim to contribute no more than a 
fair share of their time in the form of work, and to receive no less than a fair 
share of free time. These requirements of distributive justice are not 
sufficientarian, have no target or cut-off point of adequacy, and thus 
support claims to a just distribution of work time and free time beyond the 
point where all have sufficient free time to exercise their basic liberties. 
When it comes to time as a concern of justice, I believe this concern 
with time as a subject of cooperative fairness is as important as the 
concerns Rose establishes. Moreover, I’m inclined to think that this 
concern for time as a subject of cooperative fairness is needed to make 
sense of the ongoing struggles over time between labor and capital. That 
struggle will not and should not end once citizens have enough free time to 
exercise their basic rights, for an adequate amount for all is consistent with 
distributive injustice
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